



Rethinking Profiling:  A Cognitive 
Model of Bias and Its Legal 
Implications 
ometimes referred to as “Driving While Black,” but 
actually encompassing any time that law enforcement uses 
a person’s race as the basis for acting, racial profiling has become 
a matter of serious public concern.1  Academic debate of 
profiling has taken a variety of forms but often returns to a basic 
question regarding the rationality of police officers’ behavior.  
Critics argue that profiling is an irrational behavior motivated by 
racial stereotypes, which results in disproportionate harm to 
minority communities.2  Supporters respond that profiling is an 
efficient use of limited enforcement resources, and that profiling 
rests on a sound statistical foundation demonstrating that certain 
minorities are likely to engage in illegal activity at levels higher 
than other groups.3  Responding to this debate, regulators have 
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1 See, e.g., Carol Eisenberg, Imams Seek an Apology, NEWSDAY, Nov. 28, 2006, at 
A21 (discussing the removal of six Muslim imams from a US Airways flight after 
the imams were seen laying out mats and praying in the Minneapolis-St. Paul 
International Airport); Rick Hampson, In New York City, Outrage Mounts over 
Police Tactics, USA TODAY, Mar. 26, 1999, at 8A (discussing the forty-one shots 
fired at an unarmed African immigrant by four Caucasian police officers); Robert 
D. McFadden, Police Kill Man After a Bachelor Party in Queens, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
26, 2006, at 1 (discussing the killing of an unarmed African American man on his 
wedding day after New York City police officers fired over fifty rounds of 
ammunition at him). 
2 See infra notes 15–17 and accompanying text. 
3 See infra notes 13–14 and accompanying text. 
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spent substantial resources in an attempt to determine the 
soundness of the statistical support for profiling. 
Interestingly, the debate over the behavior of profiling has not 
been accompanied by a discussion of the way in which race 
actually is used to determine whether or not individuals are 
likely to engage in illegal activity.  Rather, most commentators 
proceed from a basic model of profiling that sees law 
enforcement officers as rational individuals applying statistical 
information to the goals of enforcing the law.4  According to this 
view, the problem lies either in the invalidity of officers’ 
information or officers’ learned distaste for certain minorities.5  
The purpose of this Article is to suggest a different vision of 
profiling and to discuss the implications of that vision on the 
debate over profiling and regulatory responses. 
The Article argues that profiling is not the result of conscious 
and rational action.  Rather, profiling is an implicit process that 
results from the cognitive process of categorization.  The process 
of categorization helps individuals cope with the variety of 
stimuli that surround them on a day-to-day basis.  Without the 
ability to group stimuli into categories, individuals would be 
overwhelmed in their efforts to process information and function 
in the world. 
Categorization, however, is not a process over which people 
have conscious control.  Moreover, the cognitive process of 
creating categories leads individuals to overemphasize certain 
core traits of category members.  Thus, profiling cannot be 
treated as simply a problem of misinformation or the distastes of 
a few “bad apples.”  Instead, profiling is an inescapable process 
that, by its nature, results in overestimation of the likelihood that 
members of a racial category will act in accordance with such 
alleged core traits as criminality.  Of course, if the process is an 
inescapable one, then different mechanisms are necessary to 
control profiling.  This Article looks to the developing body of 
implicit bias research to respond to this concern. 
Part I of this Article provides a short introduction to the 
problem of profiling and states’ regulatory responses.  Part II 
describes the model of rational behavior that underlies the 
traditional conception of both profiling and regulatory 
 
4 For a discussion of the different perspectives, see infra Part I. 
5 See infra notes 38–40 and accompanying text. 
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responses.  Part II then provides a new model of “implicit” 
profiling based primarily on the cognitive processes of 
categorization, and discusses the way in which this cognitive 
model reframes the basic profiling debate.  Assuming the 
implicit processes involved in profiling, Part III considers 
alternative regulatory responses to profiling. 
I 
THE PROBLEM OF PROFILING AND THE CURRENT 
REGULATORY RESPONSE 
Racial profiling has been at the forefront of academic and 
political debate in recent years.6  The practice of profiling is 
extremely hard to capture in any single definition.7  In general, 
profiling occurs when law enforcement officials initiate action 
based on an individual’s race, ethnicity, or national origin rather 
than the individual’s behavior.8  Examples of profiling behavior 
include disproportionate traffic stops and searches of minorities,9 
increased stops and searches of individuals of Middle Eastern 
descent by customs agents, and increased incidence of shooting 
unarmed African Americans.10  For purposes of consistency, this 
Article illustrates its analysis with the example of 
disproportionate traffic stops of minorities, based on police 
officers’ assumptions that minorities carry and use drugs at levels 
disproportionate to whites. 
 
6 See, e.g., R. Richard Banks, Racial Profiling and Antiterrorism Efforts, 89 
CORNELL L. REV. 1201, 1201–03 (2004); Yoram Margalioth & Tomer Blumkin, 
Targeting the Majority:  Redesigning Racial Profiling, 24 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 
317, 317–20 (2006); Floyd D. Weatherspoon, Racial Profiling of African-American 
Males:  Stopped, Searched, and Stripped of Constitutional Protection, 38 J. 
MARSHALL L. REV. 439, 439–43 (2004). 
7 For a detailed analysis of the different definitions of profiling and their 
limitations, see Mathias Risse & Richard Zeckhauser, Racial Profiling, 32 PHIL. & 
PUB. AFF. 131, 135–38 (2004). 
8 See id. at 136–38. 
9 This is often referred to as the crime of “Driving While Black.”  See, e.g., 
Katherine Y. Barnes, Assessing the Counterfactual:  The Efficacy of Drug 
Interdiction Absent Racial Profiling, 54 DUKE L.J. 1089, 1095 (2005).  See generally 
David A. Harris, The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law:  Why “Driving While 
Black” Matters, 84 MINN. L. REV. 265 (1999); Katheryn K. Russell, “Driving While 
Black”:  Corollary Phenomena and Collateral Consequences, 40 B.C. L. REV. 717 
(1999). 
10 See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 1; Hampson, supra note 1; McFadden, supra 
note 1. 
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The debate on racial profiling in large part has been framed in 
terms of profiling’s rationality.11  In essence, the arguments 
about rationality are claims about the empirical support for 
using race in determining whether to stop and/or search an 
individual.12  On one side, advocates of profiling argue that 
profiling is a rational use of information to achieve important 
and valid policing goals.  In contrast, opponents argue that 
profiling arises from invidious stereotypes and results in 
disproportionate stops and arrests of minorities. 
Supporters of profiling substantiate their claim of rationality 
by relying on data that demonstrate the disproportionate arrest 
and conviction of minorities for narcotics offenses.13  If racial 
minorities do commit crimes at higher rates than whites, 
proponents argue, it is a rational and efficient response to use 
race in determining whom to stop or search.14  Put simply, the 
logic of profiling suggests that, if minorities commit more crimes, 
they should be stopped and searched more often. 
Critics of profiling argue that, to the extent the arrest and 
conviction data suggest minorities commit crimes at higher rates 
than majorities, such data are simply the result of the greater 
number of police searches of minorities.15  A simple example 
illustrates this argument:  assume that the same percentage of 
minorities and whites traffics drugs.  If minorities are stopped at 
higher rates than whites, this results in a larger number of 
convictions of minorities for trafficking.  The larger number of 
minority convictions will feed perceptions that minorities traffic 
drugs more than whites and even more attention will be focused 
on stopping and searching minorities.  The result of this self-
 
11 See, e.g., R. Richard Banks, Beyond Profiling:  Race, Policing, and the Drug 
War, 56 STAN. L. REV. 571, 577–80 (2003); Barnes, supra note 9, at 1100; William M. 
Carter, Jr., A Thirteenth Amendment Framework for Combating Racial Profiling, 39 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 17, 17–18 (2004); Bernard E. Harcourt, Rethinking Racial 
Profiling:  A Critique of the Economics, Civil Liberties, and Constitutional 
Literature, and of Criminal Profiling More Generally, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1275, 
1276–77 (2004). 
12 Carter, supra note 11, at 17–18. 
13 Banks, supra note 11, at 577–78. 
14 See Harcourt, supra note 11, at 1276–77. 
15 See, e.g., DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE 20–21 (1999); Scott L. Johnson, 
The Self-Fulfilling Prophecy of Police Profiles, in THE SYSTEM IN BLACK AND 
WHITE 93, 93 (Michael W. Markowitz & Delores D. Jones-Brown eds., 2000); Tracy 
Maclin, The Fourth Amendment on the Freeway, 3 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 117, 
121–23 (2001). 
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fulfilling prophecy is more frequent searches and arrests of 
minorities. 
Support for this critique is found in data suggesting that 
minorities’ general drug use rates are no greater than whites’ 
drug use rates and that blacks and Hispanics are stopped and 
searched at much greater rates than whites.16  If minorities do 
not use drugs at higher rates than whites, critics argue, then 
profiling is not a rational behavior directed at efficient use of 
limited resources to minimize crime.17 
Arguments about the morality of profiling also rest on 
fairness concerns that arise from disproportionate mistreatment 
of minorities by law enforcement.  If, for example, forty percent 
of the drug-using population is comprised of minorities, when 
law enforcement chooses to spend more than forty percent of its 
efforts searching minorities, these minorities are subjected to a 
greater burden relative to the rest of the population.  Of course, 
the fact that individuals are singled out for such unequal 
treatment based solely on their race or national origin increases 
concerns regarding equal treatment.18 
The complexity of the investigative process makes it more 
difficult to determine if law enforcement is violating the 
requirement of equal treatment.  For example, Professors Risse 
and Zeckhauser recognize the validity of arguments based on 
proportional treatment but take issue with claims that 
proportionality requirements only can be satisfied if minorities 
are searched at rates equal to their likelihood of violating the 
 
16 See, e.g., DAVID A. HARRIS, PROFILES IN INJUSTICE:  WHY RACIAL 
PROFILING CANNOT WORK 13 (2002); Albert W. Alschuler, Racial Profiling and 
the Constitution, 2002 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 163, 230–31; Samuel R. Gross & Katherine 
Y. Barnes, Road Work:  Racial Profiling and Drug Interdiction on the Highway, 101 
MICH. L. REV. 651, 670 (2002). 
17 Examples of publications that take issue with claims of efficiency include:  
HARRIS, supra note 16, at 14–15; Gross & Barnes, supra note 16, at 670; Samuel R. 
Gross & Debra Livingston, Racial Profiling Under Attack, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 
1413, 1421–23 (2002). 
18 See FREDERICK SCHAUER, PROFILES, PROBABILITIES, AND STEREOTYPES 
175–97 (2003) (discussing the relationship between the moral concerns raised by 
claims of racial profiling and the claim that profiling is nothing more than acting on 
statistical evidence). 
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law.19  Risse and Zeckhauser present a simple example of the 
problem: 
Suppose we know that 10 percent of a group of individuals 
engages in an illegal activity, but only 5 percent of the 
population at large does so.  Targeting all inspections to the 
high-risk group, as opposed to the general population, doubles 
the number of criminals caught per inspection made.
20
 
Thus, there is some support for a strategy that stops only 
members of the ten-percent group. 
But the investigation of illegal activity has other important 
goals.  For example, if police only pursue the most likely 
perpetrators, others might increase their willingness to commit 
crime.  Thus, the goal of any investigation strategy must include 
conducting enough searches of low-risk groups to dissuade them 
from increasing their criminal activity.21  Hence, it is difficult to 
assess claims that members of a particular group have been 
investigated “disproportionately” simply because their stoppage 
rate does not correlate with their rate of participation in a 
particular illegal activity.  Nevertheless, Risse and Zeckhauser 
agree that complaints regarding disproportionate screening 
“cannot be brushed aside” and disproportionate screening “must 
be condemned.”22 
Regardless of the complexity of such an inquiry, most state 
governments responding to profiling focus on collecting data on 
the number of stops and arrests of minorities.23  Although the 
source of states’ responses vary–some are the result of 
legislation while others result from consent decrees that settle 
discrimination lawsuits–the core requirement of gathering data 
remains widespread.24  In addition to requiring law enforcement 
 
19 Risse & Zeckhauser, supra note 7, at 140 (“Individuals have a legitimate 
complaint if profiling occurs in a manner disproportionate to [the goal of the 
investigation].”). 
20 Id. 
21 Id. at 141; see also Harcourt, supra note 11, at 1348–54 (developing a model of 
enforcement that includes the increased demand for crime that comes from a lack 
of enforcement of a particular group). 
22 Risse & Zeckhauser, supra note 7, at 142. 
23 See generally POLICE FOUND., RACIAL PROFILING:  THE STATE OF THE LAW 
(2005), http://www.policefoundation.org/pdf/racialprofiling.pdf. 
24 For example, in Arizona, the Department of Public Safety agreed to collect 
data on traffic stops and vehicle searches as part of a settlement in response to a 
class-action lawsuit filed by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU).  Id. at 2.  
 2007] Rethinking Profiling 663 
agencies to gather data, some states’ responses contain language 
prohibiting the practice of profiling and, to a lesser extent, 
requiring law enforcement officials to undertake sensitivity 
training. 
Data gathering takes many different forms but, at a minimum, 
jurisdictions that have responded to profiling require police to 
gather information on the race of each person stopped, searched, 
and arrested.25  By determining the percentage of each racial 
group that is found to violate the law (the “hit rate”), one can 
establish a baseline for purposes of comparison.  Thus, data 
collection is intended, at least in part, to settle the threshold 
debate on whether profiling affects minorities 
disproportionately.  Although the results are not yet conclusive, 
and some police departments have been unwilling to provide 
data, there is clear evidence of profiling behavior in some 
jurisdictions.26 
States that prohibit profiling have attempted to do so in 
different ways.  For example, some states prohibit “profiling,” 
other states prohibit using race in law enforcement in any form, 
and others prohibit profiling not in keeping with the law.27  
Other states prohibit racism, while others generally pass the 
issue down the line–requiring law enforcement officials to 
develop standards that serve to prohibit the activity.28  Thus, 
 
Similarly, following a class-action settlement, the California Highway Patrol agreed 
to collect data regarding whether minority motorists are pulled over more often.  
See id. at 3.  Connecticut and Illinois laws mandate that state and local law 
enforcement agencies collect data on profiling.  Id. at 8, 10. 
25 Data collecting processes range from Nebraska’s requirement that officers who 
make traffic stops record the race of the driver on a computer in a patrol car, id. at 
22, to Illinois’s requirement that “police officers . . . record the name, address, sex, 
and race of any motorists whom they stop” as well as “whether the stop involved a 
search,” id. at 10.  For a complete analysis of the states’ responses to the problem of 
profiling, see generally id. 
26 Although many states, such as Connecticut and Maryland, have published 
reports in compliance with consent decrees or legislation, civil rights advocates 
complain about the lack of effort of some police agencies in compiling data.  For 
example, police agencies in Harris County, Texas, included in their reports only 
information on traffic stops that led to citations or arrests.  Id. at 33. 
27 For example, California and Rhode Island ban racial profiling in any form.  Id. 
at 4, 31.  However, Arizona, West Virginia, and the City of Chicago, Illinois, only 
ban police from using race or ethnicity to pull someone over.  Id. at 2, 10–11, 37. 
28 For example, Colorado and Kentucky have enacted legislation that prohibits 
the use of racial profiling by law enforcement agencies.  Id. at 6, 13.  However, 
Arkansas requires law enforcement agencies to adopt written policies against racial 
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while their means differ, many jurisdictions aim to stop profiling 
by law enforcement officials. 
A less common component of antiprofiling laws is the 
requirement that law enforcement officials undertake sensitivity 
training.29  While vague, such laws generally aim to provide 
officers with more appreciation and intimate understanding of 
minorities. 
In sum, although determining whether minorities are stopped 
at a disproportionate rate is difficult given the complexity of the 
investigative process, virtually all regulatory responses focus on 
gathering data to determine whether law enforcement officers 
are acting rationally.  Forthcoming data may provide the proof 
that vindicates one viewpoint over another.  If, as initial data 
suggests, minorities are treated disproportionately, states hope 
to remedy the problem with prohibitions on officers’ behavior, in 
addition to sensitivity training. 
II 
MODELS OF PROFILING 
A.  The Rationality Model 
Implied in the discussions of profiling and its potential 
solutions is a particular view of human rationality that suggests 
bias is the result of attitudes and conscious decisions to act in a 
biased manner.  The rationality model strongly influenced views 
of human bias in the last third of the twentieth century30 and 
correlates with the rational choice theory of behavior.  This 
section elaborates on the rationality model and then compares it 
to the cognitive model of profiling. 
 
profiling, id. at 2, and Florida requires sheriffs’ offices and municipal law 
enforcement agencies to adopt policies and practices prohibiting racism or 
discrimination, id. at 8–9.  Although the legislatures of Arkansas and Florida passed 
racial profiling laws, the adoption of policies and practices that prohibit racism have 
been left to the law enforcement agencies themselves.  See id. at 2, 6, 8–9, 13. 
29 For example, in New Jersey, all state and local police agencies have enacted 
sensitivity training programs in an effort to prevent racial profiling.  Id. at 23.  New 
Jersey officers are kept up to date on court rulings dealing with racial profiling and 
are given brochures prepared by the New Jersey Association of Chiefs of Police 
with information about discriminatory stops.  Id. 
30 See Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias:  
Scientific Foundations, 94 CAL. L. REV. 945, 945 (2006). 
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The discussion of profiling until now has been dominated by a 
particular view of prejudice that Professors Krieger and Fiske 
describe as a form of “intuitive psychology.”31  According to this 
view, one can explain people’s motivations in terms of stable 
traits or dispositions–in this case a negative disposition toward 
minorities.32  Under the intuitive model, people consciously 
choose to discriminate.  “[A] person has direct knowledge of the 
best imaginable kind of the workings of his own mind.  Mental 
states . . . are (or are normally) conscious states . . . and the 
consciousness which irradiates them can engender no       
illusions . . . .”33 
The intuitive view correlates with the rational choice theory 
that undergirds law and economics.  Rational choice assumes 
that people are self-interested and choose rationally between 
alternative opportunities in a way that maximizes utility in 
accordance with individual preferences.34  As a general matter, 
preferences are considered relatively stable35 and the rationality 
of the individual’s actions is based on his or her ability to choose 
optimal ends.36  Information plays an important role in the 
process of reasoning from preference to choice; a lack of 
information constrains the selection of optimal ends.37 
 
31 Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism in Employment 
Discrimination Law:  Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94 CAL. L. REV. 997, 
1039 (2006). 
32 Id. 
33 Id. at 1030 (quoting GILBERT RYLE, THE CONCEPT OF MIND 13–14 (1949)). 
34 See HAL R. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS 52, 70 (1987). 
35 See Krieger & Fiske, supra note 31, at 1039 (noting that “people tend to view 
intergroup bias as though it were a kind of stable disposition, analogous to a 
personality trait, which expresses itself consistently across time and situation,” and 
that “economists often describe this bias as a ‘taste for discrimination’” (quoting 
GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 41 (1957))).  See 
generally ANDREU MAS-COLELL ET AL., MICROECONOMIC THEORY (1995). 
36 See Edward L. Rubin, Rational Choice and Rat Choice:  Some Thoughts on the 
Relationship Among Rationality, Market, and Human Beings, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
1091, 1092 (2005).  “If the actor chooses the optimal means to achieve her pre-
established ends, she is rational; if she chooses suboptimal means, she is irrational.”  
Id.  “The particular claim of rational choice theory is that people are rational in this 
sense; that is, they choose the optimal means to achieve their ends.”  Id.  “Recall 
that rationality can be defined as selecting the best method of accomplishing a 
specified goal.”  Terrence Chorvat & Kevin McCabe, Neuroeconomics and 
Rationality, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1235, 1238 (2005). 
37 Rubin, supra note 36, at 1094 (“The most serious resource constraint is clearly 
a lack of information, either because no one has the information or because the 
information is not available to the decision maker.”). 
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Consider a simple example of an individual choosing between 
ten different stocks for a one-year period.  If the person has 
perfect information about future stock performance and a 
preference to make as much money as possible, one would 
assume he or she would invest in the stock that provides the 
greatest return over the year.38  Although nobody has such 
information39 and it is questionable whether people can ever 
gather information in such a way,40 this basic model assumes that 
a rational person with the correct information generally will 
make optimal decisions. 
Applying the intuitive framework to the process of profiling 
leads to a particular understanding of the problem and its 
solution.  The resulting view is that profiling can be addressed 
either by changing individuals’ preferences (or “disposition”) by 
providing “true” information, or by making the satisfaction of 
one’s preferences too costly.  In terms of information, the 
problem of profiling rests on the fact that police have 
misinformation regarding the propensity of minorities to commit 
crime.  This view might be called the “innocent-officer” view.  
Assuming that law enforcement officials have a preference for 
limiting crime,41 they will be more able to identify perpetrators 
of crimes if they have better information about criminals.  To the 
extent that officers do not have a proper understanding of the 
level at which different ethnic or racial groups commit crime, 
 
38 This example is loosely adapted from Rubin’s article.  Id. 
39 For a general discussion about how a lack of information affects rational 
decision making, see JEFFREY L. HARRISON ET AL., REGULATION AND 
DEREGULATION:  CASES AND MATERIALS 30–31, 191–208 (2d ed. 2004); RICHARD 
A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 429–38 (4th ed. 1992). 
40 For discussions of the way in which cognitive biases affect individuals’ uses of 
information, see generally Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and 
Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, 
Law and Behavioral Science:  Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and 
Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051 (2000); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, 
Judgment Under Uncertainty:  Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124 (1974). 
41 This assumption is undermined by literature that suggests individuals have a 
“taste” or “preference” for racism.  See supra note 35 and accompanying text.  To 
the extent this is true, even perfect information will not change police behavior.  
However, a preference for racism can be changed, primarily through education.  As 
discussed below, the literature on implicit bias suggests a basis for police behavior 
other than a taste for racism.  Such literature suggests that implicitly held racial 
stereotypes inform decision making at a subconscious level.  To the extent this is the 
case, simply changing tastes or providing information will not be enough to prevent 
profiling. 
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providing such information will directly affect officers’ behavior 
as to whom they stop and search.  The “problem” under such a 
view is the information, not the individual.  The solution is, of 
course, to provide better information. 
However, some commentators argue that the problem may be 
in law enforcement officers’ “taste” or “preference” for racism.  
This is the view of critics who espouse the “self-fulfilling 
prophesy” argument discussed above.  They argue that profiling 
is not a universal behavior but rather something that affects only 
those individuals who developed their tastes for racism from 
others.42 
Under this view, profiling may be solved in a number of 
different ways.  First, the problem is solved by simply prohibiting 
the profiling behavior and punishing transgressors adequately.  
This is the classic rational-choice view of the role of law, in 
which law serves as an external “cost” to the satisfaction of one’s 
preferences.43  For example, to the extent one has a taste for a 
socially unacceptable behavior–whether wife beating, stealing, 
or racism–law serves to control the behavior by making acting 
on such tastes too costly through prohibitions and penalties.  
Second, the problem can be solved by teaching individuals to 
change their preferences by means of techniques such as 
sensitivity training, whereby officers confront and rethink their 
biases against minorities.  In essence, officers are taught to 
change their tastes. 
B.  The Cognitive Model 
Surprisingly, while so much of the discussion on profiling is 
directed toward its rationality, almost no attention has been 
given to the validity of the notion of rationality that animates the 
discussion and informs the regulatory responses.  This section 
provides a different view of the process of profiling.  The 
cognitive model, an alternative approach, views profiling as the 
 
42 See, e.g., Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, An Economic Analysis of the Criminal Law 
as a Preference-Shaping Policy, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1, 14–22 (suggesting that 
preferences are learned); Susan T. Fiske, Intent and Ordinary Bias:  Unintended 
Thought and Social Motivation Create Casual Prejudice, 17 SOC. JUST. RES. 117, 
118–19 (2004) (describing this view as rooted in post–World War II Freudian views 
of behavior and stating that this analysis, while discredited in psychological circles, 
continues to be used by the lay public in describing bad behavior). 
43 See Krieger & Fiske, supra note 31, at 1016. 
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result of primarily cognitive processes, especially the process of 
categorization.  This model reveals the inadequacy of both the 
current discussion of profiling and the solutions put forth. 
Rational actor models have received a substantial amount of 
criticism in recent years.44  Legal scholars have relied on insights 
from cognitive and social psychology to criticize rational choice 
theory as failing to consider both the ways in which individuals 
actually process information45 and how social forces and group 
identity affect individual behavior.46  These criticisms can be 
seen as part of a larger movement in legal scholarship advocating 
behavioral realism.47  Behavioral realists recognize that legal 
understandings of behavior may diverge from social scientists’ 
understanding of behavior and that the “inconsistencies between 
the real world and the phenomenological models embedded in 
law can be highly problematic.”48  The failure of law to reflect 
how people behave in the real world has serious negative 
consequences, including delegitimizing law and reducing its 
effectiveness.49  Advocates of behavioral realism have used 
social science to inform a wide variety of legal theories, 
particularly antidiscrimination law and policy.50 
 
44 See, e.g., Gregory M. Duhl, Property and Custom:  Allocating Space in Public 
Places, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 199, 231–36 (2006); Daniel A. Farber, Toward a New 
Legal Realism, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 279, 281–90 (2001); Michael A. McCann, It’s Not 
About the Money:  The Role of Preferences, Cognitive Biases, and Heuristics Among 
Professional Athletes, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 1459, 1468–81 (2006); Ilya Somin, Voter 
Knowledge and Constitutional Change:  Assessing the New Deal Experience, 45 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 595, 613–17 (2003). 
45 See Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously:  
Some Evidence of Market Manipulation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1420, 1425–26 (1999); 
Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously:  The Problem 
of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 634–37 (1999); Korobkin & Ulen, 
supra note 40, at 1060–70. 
46 See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 943, 956–57 (1995); Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and 
Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 339–40 (1997). 
47 For a discussion of behavioral realism, see generally Krieger & Fiske, supra 
note 31. 
48 Id. at 999. 
49 See id. at 998–99.  One also may ask why behavioral realists believe that social 
science theories should be privileged over judicial or regulatory intuition.  For a 
discussion, see id. at 999–1001. 
50 Id. at 1003 & n.21. 
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Modern social science’s view of racial prejudice diverges 
substantially from the rational actor or intuitive model.51  While 
there are many causes of bias against racial minorities, the 
cornerstone of the new cognitive understanding lies in the 
process of categorization.52  The process of categorization is 
“fundamental to the adaptive functioning of the human 
organism, as it serves to structure the potentially infinite 
variability of stimuli into a more manageable number of distinct 
categories.”53  Categorization satisfies a basic need for cognitive 
parsimony.54  Because humans cannot process all stimuli in the 
world at all times, categorizing objects and individuals facilitates 
understanding and adapting to a complex world. 
People create categories by identifying similarities and 
differences among and between a body of diverse stimuli.  
Category formation follows the principle of metacontrast.55 
[The principle of metacontrast] holds that within any given 
frame of reference (in any situation comprising some definite 
pool of psychologically significant stimuli), any collection of 
stimuli is more likely to be categorized as an entity (i.e., 
grouped as identical) to the degree that the differences 
between those stimuli on relevant dimensions of comparison 
(intra-class differences) are perceived as less than the 




Thus, category formation is a process of comparing similarities 
and differences along relevant dimensions.  Just as groups form 
due to the perception of shared similarities, groups are delimited 
by differences from others. 
 
51 Profiling is a process by which the traits of a stereotypical group member are 
applied to a particular individual.  Interestingly, as William Carter notes, all other 
elements of profiling are based on an individual’s behavior and not his or her group 
membership.  Carter, supra note 11, at 22. 
52 Susan T. Fiske, What’s in a Category?  Responsibility, Intent, and the 
Avoidability of Bias Against Outgroups, in THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF GOOD 
AND EVIL 127, 127–32 (Arthur G. Miller ed., 2004).  This Article focuses only on 
the cognition of categorization, to the exclusion of other factors. 
53 MICHAEL A. HOGG & DOMINIC ABRAMS, SOCIAL IDENTIFICATIONS:  A 
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERGROUP RELATIONS AND GROUP PROCESSES 19 
(1988). 
54 Id. at 72. 
55 JOHN C. TURNER ET AL., REDISCOVERING THE SOCIAL GROUP:  A SELF-
CATEGORIZATION THEORY 46–47 (1987). 
56 Id. 
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Categorization carries with it a particular cognitive effect.  
The process of bringing into focus a complex world results in 
accentuating shared characteristics within a category and 
exaggerating differences between categories.57  One explanation 
for the accentuation effect is that individuals do not make 
judgments in a vacuum.58 
Tajfel and Wilkes conducted the seminal experiment 
establishing the existence of the accentuation phenomenon.59  
They asked subjects to judge the length of eight lines arranged 
from shortest to longest.60  The four shorter lines were labeled 
“A,” and the four longer lines were labeled “B.”61  The subjects 
greatly exaggerated both the difference between the “A” and 
“B” lines and the similarity of length between lines of the same 
group.62  Such exaggeration did not occur when the lines were 
unlabeled.63  Likewise, when the A/B labeling was random (not 
correlated with length), to limit the relevance of the peripheral 
dimension (grouping as “A” or “B”) to the measure of length, 
exaggeration also did not occur.64  Thus the peripheral 
dimension of labeling influenced perception of the relevant 
dimension of line length by causing observers to exaggerate the 
difference in length between groups and exaggerate similarity 
within a group. 
The process of accentuation–that is, exaggerating “in-group” 
similarities and “out-group” differences–inherent in 
categorization results in a conception of the group along 
prototypical or stereotypical dimensions.  Individual 
characteristics of group members are perceptually de-
 
57 HOGG & ABRAMS, supra note 53, at 19.  The accentuation effect is well 
established experimentally.  See, e.g., WILLEM DOISE, GROUPS AND INDIVIDUALS:  
EXPLANATIONS IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 106–12 (Douglas Graham trans., 1978) 
(reviewing the variety of studies that have found such an effect and also providing 
new experimental support for the effect); see also Henri Tajfel, A.A. Sheikl & R.C. 
Gardner, Content of Stereotypes and the Inference of Similarity Between Members of 
Stereotyped Groups, 22 ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA 191, 191–201 (1964) (establishing 
the accentuation effect in the contexts of social and physical perception). 
58 HOGG & ABRAMS, supra note 53, at 70. 
59 Id. at 19–20, 70. 
60 Id. at 19–20. 
61 Id. at 20. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 20, 70. 
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emphasized, while the relevant shared similarities of group 
members are emphasized and accentuated.65  Consider, for 
example, the group “university professors.”  Drawing on the 
stereotype,66 one might expect a professor to be bookish, 
absentminded, perhaps a bit socially inept, and dressed in a 
tweed jacket.  This is the prototype for the group.  But obviously 
many university professors do not share these traits; some 
professors even have de-emphasized traits such as physical 
strength, normally associated with groups such as laborers.  
Indeed, to the extent someone who acts like a construction 
worker identifies himself as a university professor, one would 
perceive him as not “typical.” 
The categorization model has significant implications for 
understanding profiling.  As this model demonstrates, law 
enforcement officials using racial categories to determine the 
likelihood that an individual might commit a crime may act 
“rationally” but nevertheless overestimate the likelihood that a 
person is acting illegally.  Here, the term “rationally” does not 
imply that the overestimation is the result of imperfect 
information or a learned dislike of minorities, but rather the 
result of subconscious, cognitive processes.  In this sense, the 
traditional, noncognitive model misperceives the nature of the 
problem.  As an analysis of the process of categorization makes 
clear, it is virtually impossible not to perceive individual 
members of negatively stereotyped groups as disproportionately 
predisposed to commit crimes. 
Implicit profiling is not based on direct information, such as 
when police stop only blacks in an area because a witness 
indicates the suspect was a black person.  Nor is profiling the 
result of rational individuals misusing information or acting out 
of learned dislike for minorities.  Rather, profiling is the result of 
applying a prototype (or stereotype) to an individual.  Profiling 
treats an individual not as a unique person with his or her own 
traits but as an exemplar of a category, such as “Black Person.”  
In this way, the estimation of traits regarding the group is visited 
on a particular individual.  If a police officer recalls the core or 
 
65 Id. at 70.  In the context of individualistic group formation, stereotypes are 
seen as the result of bias or misinformation on the part of group members.  Id. at 
86–87. 
66 For an examination of the sources of stereotypes, see Fiske, supra note 52, at 
128–32. 
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salient trait in a racial category such as African Americans as the 
likelihood to commit crime or use drugs, the result is the officer’s 
overestimation of the likelihood that any specific black person is 
acting in accordance with the trait. 
Critically, the main source of most stereotypical information 
may not be actual experience but the media.  As Professor Fiske 
explains, “out-group” bias leads individuals to avoid meaningful 
contact with members of other groups when they have any 
choice about the company they keep.67  Since individuals have 
limited direct information about other groups, the media 
becomes the main source of information about other racial 
groups.68  To the extent that media representations of other 
racial groups differ from their actual behavior, the resulting 
stereotypes veer further from any realistic image of the group.69 
Thus, a number of different processes inherent in 
categorization virtually guarantee that a category prototype will 
not reflect in any way the propensity of individuals within that 
category to engage in certain illegal behavior.  Constructing the 
category “black” and using the category to inform 
determinations about whether a particular black individual is 
breaking the law likely leads to overestimation that the person is 
acting that way.  Such a result is simply an artifact of the 
cognitive construction of the category. 
This suggests that the use of racial information in the process 
of policing likely never will be defensible.  As Professors Risse 
and Zeckhauser recognize, if the underlying assumptions 
regarding the propensity of individuals in a category to act 
illegally are not statistically sound, the use of categories in 
enforcement is improper.70  Risse and Zeckhauser argue that the 
official use of racial data does not reflect a valid screening 
 
67 See id. at 131. 
68 Id. at 131–32. 
69 Professors Sunstein and Jolls suggest the work of heuristics in some of these 
cases.  See Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CAL. L. 
REV. 969, 973–75 (2006).  For a more complete analysis of how heuristics may affect 
perceptions of particular outgroups, see Alex Geisinger, Are Norms Efficient?  
Pluralistic Ignorance, Heuristics, and the Use of Norms as Private Regulation, 57 
ALA. L. REV. 1, 19–29 (2005). 
70 Risse & Zeckhauser, supra note 7, at 142–43; see also SCHAUER, supra note 18, 
at 18–19 (noting that his argument defends only situations where the category 
reflects statistically sound and morally appropriate generalizations). 
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mechanism, but rather something akin to police abuse.71  Of 
course, the cognitive model suggests that officers’ behavior is not 
intentional.  Regardless, unintentional profiling has the same 
negative effects.  It results in the disproportionate treatment of 
minorities as a result of an overestimation of their likelihood to 
commit crime.72  Indeed, to the extent the prototype “Black 
Person” is built from media characterizations, it likely has very 
little relation to reality. 
III 
RETHINKING THE REGULATORY RESPONSE TO PROFILING 
The cognitive model creates problems for those who wish to 
fashion a regulatory response to profiling.  The model reveals 
bias as the result of both an unavoidable subconscious process 
and normal information processing.  This new view contrasts 
with the traditional rational actor model, which views bias as the 
result of a small number of social deviants.73  To the contrary, 
bias is the result of people’s need to process an extraordinary 
amount of stimuli with limited brain capacity; it is the result of 
“normal cognition.”74  Bias is relatively universal75 and 
automatic.76  Moreover, bias is not a conscious undertaking. 
 
71 Risse & Zeckhauser, supra note 7, at 142–43. 
72 One might argue that it is still difficult to establish disproportionate treatment 
because the complex goals of law enforcement investigations cannot be reduced to a 
simple numerical trade-off.  However, categorization always exaggerates core 
characteristics, and the media’s heavy influence on categorization correlates in no 
meaningful way with the propensity of minorities to commit crimes.  Moreover, 
categorically derived estimations of the likelihood that an individual exemplar acts 
illegally bear little relation to the actual likelihood of the individual acting illegally.  
Hence, the effect of complexity on profiling likely is overstated.  Because the 
process individuals use to make determinations of criminal behavior based on race 
is “irrational,” the difficulty in measuring whether officers act irrationally should 
not be used to defend such behavior. 
73 For a groundbreaking work in the field, see Linda Hamilton Krieger, The 
Content of Our Categories:  A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal 
Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1995). 
74 See Fiske, supra note 42, at 119. 
75 Id. at 120. 
76 The automaticity of stereotyping is supported by a number of studies.  See 
Susan T. Fiske, Stereotyping, Prejudice, and Discrimination, in 2 THE HANDBOOK 
OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 357, 364–75 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds., 4th ed. 1998); C. 
Neil Macrae & Galen V. Bodenhausen, Social Cognition:  Thinking Categorically 
About Others, 51 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 93, 96–98 (2000).  For a specific discussion 
of the notion of automaticity, see Fiske, supra note 52, at 128.  See also Jolls & 
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Rather, at the subconscious level, people construct categories 
triggered by cues that make the categories salient.77  Once a 
category is made salient, people cognitively recruit associated 
stereotypes that trigger prejudices.78  This notion of bias as 
implicit has become “the measure of choice for prejudice.”79 
What then, can or should be done about profiling?  If the 
cause is subconscious and automatic then even a full prohibition 
on the behavior is likely to have little meaningful effect.80  The 
purely cognitive picture of profiling, however, likely is not the 
whole story of the process.  As Professor Fiske has explained, 
the “cognitive revolution” in psychology may have overstated 
the role of purely cognitive processes in constructing 
stereotypes.81  Research by psychologists and others into the 
other factors that influence stereotyping may provide better 
means to regulate profiling behavior.  Similarly, research into 
implicit processes also may shed light on the types of responses 
that can affect even subconscious information processing. 
Until such research is complete, a general framework for how 
to de-bias in the context of profiling must identify mechanisms to 
decrease the influence of racial categories on enforcement 
decision making.  Much of the following discussion is based on 
studies directed at “fixing” the problems of implicit bias.  These 
studies demonstrate that certain responses can decrease the 
impacts of implicit cognition on behavior.  However, none of 
these responses has been shown to eliminate completely the 
effects of implicit bias on discriminatory behavior. 
 
Sunstein, supra note 69, at 973–74 (discussing the psychology of dual process 
theories in social psychology and describing racial stereotypes as rapid, intuitive, 
and error prone). 
77 For a discussion of implicit bias, see Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 30, at 
950–52. 
78 Fiske, supra note 42, at 119. 
79 Id. at 120 (arguing against such a purely cognitive model of bias and suggesting 
that the proper model of bias includes considerations of both cognition and 
motivation). 
80 Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair Measures:  A Behavioral Realist 
Revision of “Affirmative Action,” 94 CAL. L. REV. 1063, 1083–85 (2006).  Adding an 
external cost such as a fine or loss of employment to the prohibition may affect 
behavior, but, as discussed below, that will not actually target the causes of the 
problem. 
81 See Fiske, supra note 42, at 117–18. 
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A.  Teaching Law Enforcement Officials About Their Biases 
A key step in enabling officers to decrease the effect of bias 
on their decision making is educating them about implicit bias.  
As Professors Kang and Banaji have recognized: 
[I]n order to correct bias, decision makers . . . must be made 
aware of their own implicit biases.  Since so many of us are 
convinced that we are race- or gender-blind, we tend to dismiss 
evidence of pervasive implicit bias as somehow inapplicable to 
ourselves.  In other words, we assume that we are somehow 




A starting place for self-diagnosis is the Implicit Association 
Test (“IAT”).  The test, which measures implicit biases, is 
available for free on the internet.83  Anecdotal reports suggest 
that IAT participants experience a pervasive change in self-
awareness.84  However, promoting awareness of bias will not 
extinguish it.  Bias is rooted in subconscious, cognitive processes; 
conscious awareness of one’s own bias will not alter the 
subconscious processes that create it.  Rather, awareness 
provides a means for individuals to be more receptive to other 
efforts to limit the use of categorical bias in law enforcement and 
to control their own reliance on stereotypes when acting. 
B.  Decreasing Motivation to Rely on Stereotypes and Making the 
Stereotypes Less Cognitively Available 
One goal of reform efforts is to develop and tailor a response 
that motivates law enforcement officers to individuate a suspect 
as much as possible, instead of treating him or her as simply 
another member of a threatening group.85  Recent scholarship 
suggests that there may be ways to limit law enforcement’s 
reliance on racial categories.  Professor Fiske has argued that, in 
addition to cognitive factors, consciously controlled motivational 
factors also affect the use of categories or stereotypes.86  
 
82 Kang & Banaji, supra note 80, at 1090–91 (footnote omitted). 
83 See Project Implicit, https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/demo/takeatest.html 
(last visited Nov. 13, 2007). 
84 Kang & Banaji, supra note 80, at 1091. 
85 See Fiske, supra note 42, at 123–24 (noting that decreasing the motivation to 
categorize allows for more individualized analysis of the person). 
86 Id. at 122. 
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According to Fiske, factors such as a desire to belong to a group, 
the level of perceived threat to the group, and estimations of 
how deeply shared a stereotype is among group members can all 
affect one’s willingness to rely on stereotypes.87  If Fiske is 
correct, decreasing the influence of these factors may decrease 
an officer’s willingness to employ stereotypes when enforcing the 
law.  For example, individuals may be more willing to recall and 
rely on categories or stereotypes if they believe the stereotypical 
vision is shared widely by other members of the group.88  To the 
extent that such stereotypes are not shared by law enforcement 
officers, simply informing them that these views are not shared 
might decrease officers’ willingness to rely on stereotypes. 
Fiske’s research leads to the conclusion that current 
regulatory efforts to control profiling may actually increase, 
rather than decrease, racial profiling.  If efforts to teach officers 
about profiling or to coerce them not to use race in their policing 
are perceived as a threat to the group, such efforts may backfire 
by causing officers to be more willing to rely on destructive 
categories as a response to the perceived threat. 
Similarly, Professors Sunstein and Jolls suggest that implicit 
bias can be decreased by forcing officers to focus on individual 
factors when making decisions.89  Professors Greenwald and 
Krieger note “that attentional focus could attenuate automatic 
influences on social judgment, if those automatic influences were 
relatively weak.”90  Forcing law enforcement officers to focus on 
behavioral factors could attenuate their reliance on categories.  
A large number of behaviors have been correlated with certain 
criminal activity.  For example, not maintaining eye contact, 
shifting in place and other body language, wearing loose-fitting 
clothes, and wearing sunglasses indoors all have been associated 
with the likelihood an individual is carrying drugs.91  Requiring 
officers to focus on these factors, instead of using the proxy of 
race, in analyzing the likelihood that someone is breaking the 
law can serve to crowd out the racial category in decision 
 
87 Id. at 123–24. 
88 See id. 
89 See Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 69, at 980. 
90 Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 30, at 962 (citing Anothony G. Greenwald & 
Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Social Cognition:  Attitudes, Self-Esteem, and 
Stereotypes, 102 PSYCHOL. REV. 4, 17 (1995)). 
91 See SCHAUER, supra note 18, at 168. 
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making.  Making it more difficult to use race cognitively in 
analyzing the likelihood an individual is engaging in illegal 
activity will decrease the role of invidious stereotypes on this 
process. 
C.  Changing the Makeup of Police Departments to Both Increase 
Diversity and Partner Members of Different Races 
The “Social Contact Hypothesis” suggests that increasing 
interaction between members of different groups decreases 
implicit bias.92  Significant experimental evidence, including a 
meta-analysis of over 500 studies, now supports this theory.93  
Other studies similarly demonstrate lower attitudinal bias to 
correlate with the number of contacts one has with other racial 
groups.94  When a person forms new connections with members 
of a previously devalued group, implicit bias toward that group 
can decrease rapidly.95 
To suggest that increasing contact between group members 
will solve all the problems of profiling may, of course, overstate 
the case.  At least one study, based in part on anecdotal 
evidence, suggests that certain stereotypes survive interaction 
with “out-group” members.96  Professors Kang and Banaji 
respond to this problem by suggesting that there is a difference 
between attitudes and stereotypes and suggesting that 
interaction positively affects the former but not the latter.97  
While the existence of such contrary evidence must temper 
reliance, a wealth of evidence makes clear that intergroup 
interaction likely has some positive effects on implicit attitudes 
toward other groups.  Encouraging intergroup interaction would 
thus support efforts to decrease profiling. 
In sum, recognizing that profiling is the result of cognitive 
processes leads to a much different regulatory response to the 
problem.  Current regulations that require gathering information 
on the amount of race-related stops and arrests, bans on 
profiling, and sensitivity training likely will have little effect in 
 
92 See Kang & Banaji, supra note 80, at 1102–03. 
93 See id. 
94 See id. at 1103. 
95 Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 30, at 964. 
96 See Kang & Banaji, supra note 80, at 1104. 
97 Id. at 1104–05. 
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meaningfully changing law enforcement behavior.  Indeed, the 
reticence of some law enforcement officials to provide 
information suggests that such prohibitions have done little to 
affect whom police officers stop, search, and arrest.98 
 
CONCLUSION 
Debate about the validity of both profiling and regulatory 
responses is hampered by an incomplete, and perhaps incorrect, 
vision of the way in which profiling occurs.  The traditional 
understanding of profiling assumes that such behavior is learned 
and subject to conscious control.  However, decades of research 
into the way people actually think about racial minorities 
suggests a different mechanism, based primarily on the cognitive 
process of categorization.  The cognitive model provides a much 
different understanding of the causes of profiling and potential 
solutions.  It is time for the law to catch up to the social sciences 
in its understanding of human behavior.  Failure to understand 
how officers actually profile will lead to failure in addressing the 
problem. 
 
98 See supra note 26 and accompanying text.  For more information on 
compliance with information requests, see generally POLICE FOUND., supra note 23. 
